Pause for a moment, and think about it ...
EVER SINCE THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT annexed the province of East Timor more than two decades ago, the area has been embroiled in one of the bloodiest struggles in South East Asia. Thousands of civilians had died, or disappeared. So when Indonesian President B.J. Habibie announced that the referendum to decide on the fate of East Timor was going to be held on August 30th this year, the world thought that the issue would finally be resolved. Maybe now we could strike one item out from the long list of territorial disputes destined to give the world headaches well into the 21st century.
The referendum was sponsored by the United Nations to safeguard the credibility of the poll results. The people of East Timor were given two choices � autonomy under Indonesia, or independence. The process went on despite being plagued by militia violence.
More than a year before the poll militias had been formed under government sponsorship. This followed the street protests, ethnic violence and looting toward the end of Ex-President Suharto�s rule. The government had intended to utilize the militias as civilian enforcers, as the military and the police were not enough to bring the country back to order.
But after peace had been restored the government left them as they were. There were no attempts to disarm them. This is where the troubles began in East Timor. The members of government-sponsored militias were anti-independence. Meanwhile, the weakening of Jakarta�s power following change in the presidency and the political void created by the recent elections freedom allowed freedom fighters to organize their own militias.
For months these two groups have clashed and both sides suffered serious casualties. Pro-Jakarta militias said they were fighting to protect what was theirs, and pro-independence militias thought they were fighting for their future.
When the poll results showed an overwhelming majority for independence (more than 70 percent of the voters chose independence), all hell broke loose in East Timor. Overnight, the streets of Dili and other major towns turned into war zones, and the militias besieged UN staffs assigned to assist in the referendum. Fighting spread into the countryside in a matter of days. The situation degenerated rapidly from here. Thousands of refugees have left the province, and the military was accused of having an invisible hand in the violence.
Many have accused the government of not being committed to the issue of East Timor�s independence. But if Indonesia was really committed to East Timor, then it has maneuvered itself into a very difficult position. The present disorder in East Timor makes it nearly impossible, in a time frame of six months, to implement steps to grant East Timor independence.
As now both sides of the conflict have a bargaining chip on their hands, any negotiation to end the fighting would prove to be tedious. The pro-Jakarta militias have their arms and would want to keep them, now that a �war� has started. They feel that only the presence of the Indonesian government could guarantee their safety, and when Jakarta can no longer exert its political strength over East Timor, they will claim that other side is likely to come after them. On the other hand, pro-independence fighters now have the poll results and would accept nothing less.
Some fatal mistakes were made in the way the whole process was handled. First of all was the timing. After the general election a working government had yet to be formed. The caretaker government was weak in exerting control over the situation. A procedure as delicate and critical as a referendum should never have been held under a transitional administration. The government faltered under internal and external pressure to clear the matter of East Timor. In the rush to hold the poll it had neglected to solicit an agreement between rival militias to adhere to the results. In fact, no working structure was in place to give the people of East Timor representation. Representation is crucial, whatever the outcome of the referendum is, as a tool for both communication and a smooth transition from the present system to autonomy or independence.
Habibie�s government had also been slow in addressing the concerns of the pro-Jakarta Timorese. This has led to an atmosphere of helplessness and paranoia, forcing them to take matters into their own hands.
The absence of a peacekeeping force from the start was another mistake comitted. Judging from the attacks on UN staff since the beginning, it was clear that the militias were getting more and more aggressive, and Indonesia had not provided enough protection in East Timor. A peacekeeping force in East Timor could have prevented the outbreak of violence, or in a worst-case scenario, contained it. Again the government�s weakness showed when it would not allow UN peacekeepers to watch over the referendum, and insisted on posting only a minimum number of military personnel in East Timor, but the pro- independence portion of the population viewed Indonesian troops as a potential act of aggression against them.
Now that the fighting had elevated there is no way Indonesia can send in its army to stop it without considerably more bloodshed. An army in East Timor must fight two enemies � pro-independence militias who think that the army wants to take East Timor away from them again, and desperate pro-Jakarta militias who had just seen their worst fear of having the government betray them materialize before their eyes. A call for a UN peacekeeping force would be in order. But members of the UN may be reluctant to send their soldiers on a D-day Normandy Beach Landing-style mission � fighting an entrenched enemy on enemy grounds. Both ways, whatever military force that venture into East Timor now will certainly sustain some costly losses.
Another mistake Jakarta made was not protecting the figureheads of East Timor. One of the first people the militias sought out was Bishop Carlos Belo, spiritual leader of the East Timorese. He had fled from the province after the militias attacked and set fire to his residence. Jakarta�s decision to release East Timor rebel leader Jose Alexandre �Xanana� Gusmao from custody and fly him to East Timor was also seen as a deliberate attempt to compromise his safety. Both the bishop and Gusmao are important symbols of East Timor�s fight for independence. If by any chance they were killed in the hands of pro-Jakarta militias the backlash from the freedom fighters would be unimaginably horrifying.
The failure of implementing independence in East Timor rested on the fact that the government was not prepared for it. The referendum should have been held under a stronger government. The people of East Timor should have been given representation in anticipation of a change in the province�s political status and administration. Jakarta should have started some kind of an executive structure to cope with the changes that come with the poll. Negotiations should have been initiated beforehand to prepare for the outcomes and to put all worries to rest. No resources should be left unexhausted to preserve peace. And everything must be done to protect the leaders and figureheads of East Timor�s struggle.
Sadly Jakarta went on its path without neither looking back nor forward. It looks like East Timor will still give the world a headache after all. In the true essence of the Y2K bug � a creation of the 20th century, and trouble for the 21st.
Thoughts are like seeds. As are my thoughts, so will be my attitude
and behaviour. Therefore my focus shouldn�t be so much on wrong
behaviour as on the thinking which causes it. I need to be aware of how much damage is caused by negative thoughts. Negative, wasteful thinking over a long period of time will put me right back into the gutter. The task of a student of spirituality is to change situations through thoughts. I must change myself first, then I can change the world. - An abstract from: The Wisdom and Words of Dadi Janki |